Abstract. TWINE is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ECRYPT Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography 2011, Belgium. The cipher consists of 36 rounds and has two versions TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 supporting key lengths of 80 and 128 bits, respectively. The block length of the two versions is 64-bit. In this paper, we present the first single-key attacks on the both versions of the cipher. In these attacks, we use the recently developed biclique technique. The complexities of the attacks on TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 are 2 79.10 and 2 126.82 respectively and the data requirement for the two attacks is 2 60 .
Introduction
The needs for security and privacy issues in resource constraint platforms such as RFID tags and sensor nodes give rise to design lightweight cryptographic algorithms. Some of the lightweight algorithms recently proposed are HIGHT [6] , PRESENT [2] , KATAN/KTANTAN [3] , PRINTcipher [7] , KLEIN [4] , LED [5] , Piccolo [9] , and TWINE [10] .
In this paper, we give our cryptanalytic results on TWINE. TWINE supports two key lengths, 80 and 128 bits. For each key length, encryption functions are the same but the key schedules are different. Corresponding to the key lengths, we denote TWINE-80 and TWINE-128. To the best of our knowledge, the most powerful attack is the impossible differential attacks against 23-round TWINE-80 and 24-round TWINE-128 with time complexities of 2 76.88 and 2 115.10 encryptions, respectively [10] . In this paper, we present attacks on the full TWINE-80 and TWINE-128. In these attacks, we use the biclique technique [1] . The complexities of the attacks on TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 are 2 79.10 and 2 126.82 , respectively.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give the notation which we use throughout the paper and a short description of TWINE algorithm. We overview the biclique technique in Section 3. In Section 4 and 5 we present the attacks on TWINE-80 and TWINE-128, respectively. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
Notation and a Short Description of TWINE

Notation
Throughout the paper, we use the following notations:
A : a bit string A(i)
: i-th nibble of A. The left most nibble is A(0). A(i, j, ..., k) : concatenation of i, j, ... , k-th nibbles of A.
: concatenation of i, (i + 1), ..., j-th nibbles of A where i ≤ j.
: concatenation of i, (i + 1), ..., j-th bits of A where i ≤ j. A <<< i : i-bit cyclic left shift of A. A||B : concatenation of A and B. RK i : 32-bit round key used in the i-th round where 1 ≤ i ≤ 36. K i : k-bit value calculated in the key schedule where k is the key length of the cipher. X i : the output of the i-th round where X 0 is the plaintext and X 36 is the ciphertext.
TWINE
TWINE is a block cipher supporting two key lengths, 80 and 128 bits. The global structure of TWINE algorithm is a variant of Type 2 generalized Feistel structure [12] with 16 4-bit sub-blocks. Each version of the algorithm has the same round function depicted in Figure 1 and consists of 36 rounds. In the round function, the key addition is applied before the S-box operation as seen in the figure and then the permutation is performed. In the last round the permutation does not exist.
The two versions of TWINE have key schedules which consist of S-box, round constant addition,
, and permutation operations. The key schedule of TWINE-80 generates 36 32-bit round keys from the 80-bit master key as follows: TWINE-128 has the following key schedule which generates 36 32-bit round keys from the 128-bit master key. Our attacks are independent from the S-box and constants so we skip the details. For a complete description of the algorithm one can refer to [10] .
An Overview of the Biclique Cryptanalysis Technique
In this section, we give an overview of the biclique technique on block ciphers proposed in [1] . In the biclique attack, firstly the key space is divided into 2 k−2d subspaces in which there exists 2 2d keys where k and d is the key length and the dimension of the biclique, respectively. Then, for all the key subspaces the two steps, biclique construction and meet-in-the-middle attack, are applied. To perform the two steps, firstly the cipher E is considered as a composition of three parts f , g, and h where E = h • g • f . Then, a biclique is constructed on the first or last part (in the attack on TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 we construct the bicliques on the first and last part as done in [11] and [1] , respectively). After that, the meet-in-the-middle attack is applied on the remaining parts. In this section we give the attack idea in the case that the biclique is constructed in the first part. The attack idea is similar for the other case.
A
Two methods to construct a biclique are given in [1] .
In this work, we use one of the methods called independent related-key differentials. In this method, first S 0 is calculated from a chosen P 0 under the key K 0,0 . Then, S j and P i values are calculated from P 0 and S 0 using
Lets the differential trails in forward and backward directions called as ∆ j and ∇ i , respectively. If the trails does not have common active non-linear operations such as S-boxes then the probability of the equation f Ki,j (P i ) = S j where
The second step is the meet-in-the-middle attack on h • g. In this step first C i = E K (P i ) values are obtained from the encryption oracle. After that a partial matching is searched at some portion v between g and h. This matching step has two sub-steps also. Firstly, in the forward and backward direction the internal values which affect the value of v and does not depend on the value of i and j respectively calculated using K 0,j and K i,0 . Then the remaining internal values which affect the values of v are calculated using K i,j for all i and j. The keys K i,j are selected as candidate keys which lead to a matching on v. The number of candidates will be approximately 2 2d−m in a subspace where m is the bit length of v. The total number of key candidates will be 2
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are performed to eliminate all the wrong candidates.
Biclique Cryptanalysis of TWINE-80
In this section, we present a biclique attack on the full TWINE-80. Firstly, we divide the key space into 2 72 subspaces of 2 8 keys each. Then for each key subspace we construct a biclique on the first 8 rounds and by using this biclique we apply the meet-in-the-middle attack on the last 28 rounds of the cipher.
Key Partitioning
The base keys of the key subspaces are of the form K 0,0 = ( * * * * | * * * 0| * * * * |0 * * * | * * * * ), where two nibbles are fixed to zero and the remaining 18 nibbles determine the subspace. The 2 8 keys {K i,j } in the subspaces are taken as follows
Biclique Construction on 8 Rounds
First of all, S 0 is calculated from a randomly chosen P 0 as S 0 = f K0,0 (P 0 ) where f is the first 8 rounds of the cipher. Then a biclique is constructed using the following two sets of 2 4 related-key differentials with respect to the base computation P 0
1. ∆ j -differentials over f . Each related-key differential in the first set maps input difference ∆P = 0 to an output difference ∆ j = ∆S = S 0 S j under the key difference ∆ K j = (0000|0000|0000|j000|0000).
2. ∇ i -differentials over f −1 . Each related-key differentials in the second set maps input difference ∆S = 0 to an output difference ∇ i = ∇P = P 0 P i under the key difference ∇ K i = (0000|000i|0000|0000|0000).
∆ j and ∇ i differentials are given in Figure 2 . As seen in the figure the differential trails do not share any active S-box. Thus
As a result, the triple ({P i }, {S j }, {K i,j }) with the definition
is a 8-round biclique of dimension 4.
Note that there is no difference in the 2-nd nibble of the plaintext in the biclique. Thus we can use the plaintexts whose 2-nd nibble is a fixed value. This reduces the data requirement of the attack to 2 60 .
The Meet-in-the-Middle Step
By the biclique construction, 2 4 plaintexts P i and 2 4 intermediate states S j are available with corresponding K i,j 's. First of all, we obtain C i in the chosen plaintext scenario. Then, we check if there is some i, j such that
where g and h as the composition of the rounds from the beginning of the 9-th round to the end of the 19-th round and from the beginning of the 20-th round to the end of the 36-th round respectively. For each one of the 2 72 key subspaces, the complexity of this stage is 2 8 . Hence, the overall complexity of the attack will be near exhaustive search, but we can reduce this complexity applying the attack given in Algorithm 1. In the algorithm the nibble X 19 (3) is taken as the matching variable v. To meet on v, we do partial calculations in forward direction starting from S j and in backward direction starting from C i .
Algorithm 1
1: Sj and Ci's are given. 2: for j in 0,1,...15 do 3:
Calculate the nibbles colored in gray in the forward direction in Figure 3 and (6)] using K0,j and Sj.
4:
for i in 0,1,...15 do 5:
Calculate the nibbles colored in black in the forward direction in Figure 3 using Ki,j and the values calculated in step 3.
6:
Store X19(3) in the (16 × i + j)-th cell of a table called A.
7:
end for 8: end for 9: for i, j in 0,1,...15 do 10:
Calculate the nibbles colored in black in the backward direction in Figure 3 using Ci and Ki,j.
11:
if The calculated value of X19 (3) is equal to the value in the (16 × i + j)-th cell of A then 12:
if Ki,j satisfies another plaintext-ciphertext pair then 13:
Output Ki,j as the right key 14:
end if 15:
end if 16: end for 
The Attack Complexity
The computational complexity of the attack is composed of several parts. In the biclique construction step, for each of the 2 72 key subspaces we perform 2 2.78 encryptions are performed to construct a biclique. In the meet-in-the-middle attack given in Algorithm 1, the total number of S-box calculated for 2 4 and 2 8 different keys are 30 and 127 as seen in Figure 3 as gray and black S-boxes, respectively. Since the average number of remaining keys after the condition in Step 
Biclique Cryptanalysis of TWINE-128
In this section, we introduce a biclique attack on the full TWINE-128. In this attack we divide the key space considering K 32 . The attack steps are similar to the attack steps given in the previous section. Firstly, we divide the key space into 2 120 subspaces of 2 8 keys each and then for each key subspace we construct a biclique on the last 11 rounds and by using this biclique we perform the meetin-the-middle attack on the first 25 rounds.
Key Partitioning
The key subspaces are enumerated by 2 120 base keys of the form K 
Contructing a Biclique
First of all, S 0 is calculated from a randomly chosen C 0 as S 0 = h
(C 0 ) where h is the last 11 rounds of the cipher. Then a biclique is constructed using the following two sets of 2 4 related-key differentials with respect to the base computation C 0
1. ∆ j -differentials over h −1 . Each related-key differential in the first set maps input difference ∆C = 0 to an output difference ∆ j = ∆S = S 0 S j under the key difference ∆ K j = (0000|0000|0000|0000|0000|00j0|0000|0000).
2. ∇ i -differentials over h. Each related-key differentials in the second set maps input difference ∆S = 0 to an output difference
∆ j and ∇ i differentials are given in Figure 4 . As seen in the figure the differential trails do not share any active S-box. Thus
As a result, the triple ({S j }, {C i }, {K i,j }) with the definition
is a 11-round biclique of dimension 4.
Note that there is no difference in the 7-th nibble of the ciphertext in the biclique. Thus we can use the ciphertexts whose 7-th nibble is a fixed value. This reduces the data requirement of the attack to 2 60 .
The Meet-in-the-Middle Step
The attack is very similar to that in TWINE-80. In this attack we choose the subcipher f from the beginning of the 1-st round to the end of the 6-th round, and the subcipher g from the beginning of the 7-th round to the end of the 25-th round. The nibble X 6 (11) is taken as the matching variable v. The meet-in-themiddle step is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2
1: Pi and Sj's are given. 2: for i in 0,1,...15 do 3:
Calculate the nibbles colored in gray in the forward direction in Figure 5 using K 32 i,0 and Pi.
4:
for j in 0,1,...15 do 5:
Calculate the nibbles colored in black in the forward direction in Figure 5 using K 32 i,j and the values calculated in step 3. 6:
Store X6(11) in the (16 × i + j)-th cell of a table called A.
7:
end for 8: end for 9: for j in 0,1,...15 do 10:
Calculate the nibbles colored in gray in the backward direction in Figure 5 and
, S[X20(15) ⊕ RK20(6)] using K 32 0,j and Sj.
11:
for i in 0,1,...15 do 12:
Calculate the nibbles colored in black in the backward direction in Figure 5 using Sj, K 32 i,j and the values calculated in step 10.
13:
if The calculated value of X6 (11) 
The Attack Complexity
For each key subspace, to construct a biclique 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the first single-key attacks on the full TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 by using recently developed biclique attack technique. In the both attacks 2 60 data and 2 8 memory are required and the time complexities of the attacks on TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 are 2 79.10 and 2 126.82 encryption operations, respectively.
